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SUBDIVISION CONTROL IN SOUTH CAROLINAt
William H. Ledbetter, Jr.*
I. OBJECTIVES OF SUBDIVISION CONTROL
The objectives of subdivision control are essentially the
same as those of comprehensive zoning, which are usually said
to be: to promote, improve and protect the public health,
safety, morals, order, appearance, land values and general
welfare of the community; to protect property against blight
and depreciation; to promote desirable living conditions and
the sustained stability of neighborhoods; to encourage the
most appropriate use of land and buildings; and to conserve
the value of land and buildings.1 Actually, these are the
general objectives of the concept of community planning, and
zoning and subdivision controls are but two legal instruments
devised to implement the planning program.
Subdivision control is an important tool in the program
of community planning. Although zoning is older and much
broader in scope and effect, subdivision control is increasingly
necessary to urban development as private developers build
huge residential tracts that establish land use patterns which
endure for years through the creation and installation of
streets, utilities, water and sewage systems, and parks and
open spaces (or the lack thereof). Through the proper
exercise of the police power, such development can be guided,
as aptly expressed in Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. West Orange :2
Planning confined to the common need is inherent in the authority
to create the municipality itself. It is as old as government itself; it
is of the very essence of civilized society. A comprehensive scheme of
t This article was prepared initially under the auspices of the South Caro-
lina Planning and Grants Division, acting through the Division of Community
Planning and was funded in part by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development under §701 of the Housing Act of 1954 amended. The original
article has been revised and abridged for publication here.
* B.A. cur laude, Campbell College; LL.B., University of Richmond;
LL.M., Yale University; Associate, Whitticar, Whitticar and Sokol, Fredericks-
burg, Virginia; former Associate Professor of Law, University of South
Carolina; member of Virginia Bar and American Bar Association.
1. E.g., S.C. CODE AN. §14-350.16 (Supp. 1970).
2. 120 NJ.L. 145, 198 A. 225 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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physical development is requisite to community efficiency and progress.
To particularize, the public health, safety, order and prosperity are
dependent on the proper regulation of municipal life. The free flow
of traffic with a minimum of hazard of necessity depends upon the
number, location and width of streets, and their relation to one another,
and the location of building lines; and these considerations likewise
enter into the growth of trade, commerce, and industry ... We are sur-
rounded with the problems of planless growth. The baneful conse-
quences of haphazard development are everywhere apparent. There
are evils affecting the health, safety, and prosperity of our citizens that
are well-nigh insurmountable because of the prohibitive corrective
cost 8
The Comprehensive Planning Act of South Carolina,
4
states that subdivision regulations are designed to accomplish
the following objectives:
(1) To encourage the development of economically sound and
stable municipalities and counties;
(2) To assure the timely provision of required streets, utilities, and
other facilities and services to new land developments;
(3) To assure the adequate provision of safe convenient traffic
access and circulation, both vehicular and pedestrian, in and through
new land developments;
(4) To assure the provision of needed public open spaces and
building sites in new land developments through the dedication or
reservation of land for recreational, education, and other public pur-
poses, and
(5) To assure in general the wise and timely development of new
areas, in harmony with the comprehensive plan of municipalities and
counties.5
More specifically, subdivision regulations undertake to
require developers to do the original work of installing the
streets, drainage facilities, water and sewage systems, and
utilities in proper condition and in coordination with existing
services and planned routes. At least indirectly, most regula-
tions prevent or discourage fraud on purchasers by simplifying
records and preventing confusion in land descriptions.
On the other hand, the regulations are not supposed
to be concerned with the advantage or detriment of a sub-
division to a particular neighboring property owner, but
rather the effect upon the entire community as a social,
economic and political unit. Thus, a proposed subdivision
plan cannot be rejected by the planning commission simply
3. Id. at 150-51, 198 A. at 229.
4. S.C. CODE ANN. §§14-341 to 350.46 (Supp. 1970).
5. Id. §14-350.29.
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because certain adjacent landowners do not want a sub-
division established in the vicinity.6 Furthermore, although
one of the objectives of subdivision control is "the wise and
timely development of new areas,"'7 it is doubtful that a
planning agency can reject a proposed subdivision plan on
the ground that the development is "economically unfeasible"
or that the demographic projections of the community do not
indicate enough influx of people in that area of the community
to justify the development at the particular time.
II. PowER To IMPOSE SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS
Regulation and control of subdivision activity is the
responsibility of the municipality or county governing
authority. Since these governing bodies are statutory
creations, they have no powers other ihan those which are
expressly granted by the legislature, or else necessarily
implied therefrom. Accordingly, they must perform their
prescribed activities within the statutory ambit.8 Although
the question has never arisen in this state, it is quite clear
that the local governing authority has no power to regulate
land subdivision without adopting the applicable provision
of its state enabling legislation.9 Once the locality has adopted
regulations pursuant to the enabling act of the state, sub-
division control must thereafter be exercised only through
the avenues provided by law, and any deviation or circum-
vention is illegal.' 0
Litigation is rare in which the authority of a municipality
or county governing body to impose subdivision controls has
been broadly challenged. This is usually attributed to the fact
that zoning was commonplace before subdivision regulation
came into widespread use. Courts have noted that similarity
between these kinds of land-use controls, and the approval
of subdivision regulation has sometimes been supported by
such analogy. Thus, subdivision controls have been consist-
ently upheld where they have been tested. 1
6. E. YoxLEY, THE LAw OF SUBDIVISIONS 121 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
YOKLEY].
7. S.C. CODE ANN. §14-350.29(5) (Supp. 1970).
8. YOKLEY §4.
9. Gruber v. Mayor & Township Committee, 68 N.J. Super. 118, 172 A.2d
47 (Super. Ct 1961).
10. YoKL-EY §4.
11. 3 R. ANDERsoN, AmERICAN LAW OF ZONING §19.04 (1968) [herein-
after cited as ANDERSON].
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The power to impose subdivision regulations, like zoning,
is predicated on that part of the state's police power which
may be delegated to its political subdivisions. Without this
regulation the haphazard development of subdivisions would
accentuate problems relating to streets, traffic safety, water
and sewer services, and public health-all of which are proper
subjects of police power regulation.
All states have enabling legislation authorizing the
promulgation of local subdivision regulations. Although the
various statutes differ in detail, most of them are similar in
fundamentals, having been derived from the early model acts
of Bettman and Bassett and Williams.12 Both of these models
provided that the planning commission rather than the legisla-
tive authority exercise the plat approval power, and this has
been the pattern of most subdivision enabling legislation
including that of South Carolina.
The present enabling law in this State is sections
14-350.28-14-850.38,18 part of the Comprehensive Planning
Act of 1967. Earlier legislation enabling the regulation of
subdivisions in counties is found in section 14-351 et seq., and
earlier enabling statutes for municipalities is in section
47-1001 et seq., and sections 47-699.158--47-699.161. The
1967 Act does not repeal these older laws but rather is intended
to provide the basis for all new ordinances. Thus, the new
law in no way affects the validity of the earlier legislation
or the several ordinances adopted thereunder.
The focus of this text is primarily on the 1967 Act
because it is the enabling legislation now being used. But
this analysis is not irrelevant to those areas operating under
the older acts. The rules are generally the same except where
some valid provision of any earlier legislation is expressly
to the contrary.
III. IMPOSITION OF CONDITIONS
A. In General
It is well settled that, as a condition precedent to the
approval of subdivision plats or plans, reasonable conditions
may be imposed by the ordinance and implemented by the
staff of the planning commission. These requirements can
12. Id. §19.05.
13. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§14-350.28-.38 (Supp. 1970).
[Vol. 24
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pertain to provision for streets, curbs and gutters, water and
sewer systems, drainage, and other facilities that tend to
create conditions favorable to the safety and convenience of
the residents and of the general community. 14 The ability to
impose conditions affords the community its last opportunity
to insure that the new development will be served by proper
water, sewage and utilities systems and will comport with
the land-use plan of the community, and to require that the
subdivider absorb the cost, or some of the cost, of providing
essential services to the residents of the new area.
Although the subdivision approval process is clothed in
legal standards and has several formal stages - including
notice and public hearing - the heart of the review process
is the dialogue between the planning commission staff and
the subdivider and his engineer. The author of a major
treatise on land regulation has appropriately described the
actual method by which conditions are applied:
Most municipalities provide a two-step procedure which includes
a preliminary or tentative approval, followed by final approval of the
plat. Preliminary approval commonly is a product of examination of a
preliminary plat and other information furnished by the subdivider,
examination of the site and its environs, the hearing, and conferences
with the subdivider. While a determination of compliance with the
official map, the master plan, and the zoning regulations may be a
relatively simple matter, the application of many of the standards
articulated in the subdivision regulations (or in the enabling acts) may
be more difficult. These may range from the installation of fire alarm
boxes to the design and location of one-way streets, and may include
paving specifications, drainage systems, sanitary sewers, recreational
space, and numerous other improvements. The need and the cost will
vary widely from one subdivision to another.
The common practice is to confer at length with the subdivider and
finally to articulate the specific application of standards in the form of
conditions for approval of his plat. In other words, approval of the plat
is conditioned upon specific changes in his design, the installation of
specified improvements, and sometimes the reservation or dedication of
land for certain public purposes ...
From the developer's point of view, the economics of his venture
require that he pass the cost of meeting these conditions to the pur-
chaser of his lots or homes. Accordingly, he will submit to the condi-
tions which permit him to develop the land at a projected profit, but he
will litigate if the conditions render development unprofitable, or less
14. Ayers v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Exchange
National Bank v. Lake Forest, 40 Ill. 2d 281, 239 N.E.2d 811 (1968); Sansoucy
v. Planning Board, 246 N.E.2d 811 (Mass. 1969).
159
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profitable than his minimum expectation. [T]he cost of satisfying a
condition is at the center of every disputeJ 5
The power to impose conditions is derived from a state's
enabling act. Thus, a condition for approval can be imposed
only if it is authorized by the statute.' 6
In South Carolina, the new Comprehensive Planning Act
sets forth in some detail the conditions that subdivision regula-
tions must or may contain. 17 All regulations adopted pursuant
to the Act must prescribe that no subdivision plan will be
approved unless all land intended for use as building sites
can be used safely for building purposes without danger from
flood or other menaces to health and safety. In addition, the
regulations may provide for the harmonious development of
the municipality and the county; for the coordination of
streets within subdivisions with other existing or planned
streets or official map streets; for the size of blocks and lots;
for the dedication or reservation of land for streets, school
sites, and recreation areas and of easements for utilities and
other public services and facilities; and for a distribution of
population and traffic which will tend to create conditions
favorable to health, safety, convenience, prosperity or general
welfare. More specifically, the statute states that the regu-
lations ...
may include requirements as to the extent to which and the manner in
which streets shall be graded, surfaced, and improved, and water,
sewers, septic tanks, and other utilities mains, piping, connections, or
other facilities shall be installed as a condition precedent to the approval
of the plat.' 8
B. Streets
The South Carolina enabling legislation provides that
subdivision regulations may require streets to be graded,
surfaced and improved in proper fashion as a prerequisite
to plat approval.' 9 This is the most common condition to plat
approval throughout the country, and is everywhere upheld
as reasonable. These requirements are intended (1) to protect
purchasers in the subdivision by providing adequate ingress
15. ANDnasoN §19.24 (footnotes omitted).
16, Beach v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 141 Conn. 79, 103 A.2d 814
(1954) ; Castle Estates v. Park & Planning Bd., 344 Mass. 329, 182 N.E2d 540
(1962).
17. S.C. CODE ANN. §14-350.30 (Supp. 1970).
18. Id.
19. Id.
[Vol. 24
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and egress; (2) to advance the objectives of the community
plan and the street patterns as set forth in the official map;
and (3) to protect the local government from the financial
burden of constructing additional streets into particular areas
every time a new private development originates, and of
having to continuously repair poorly-constructed streets.
Normally, the regulations require that streets shown on
the plat be of at least a certain width and design. For example,
the commission can require that there be no dead-ends, that
the right-of-ways be at least 50 feet, that intersections not
contain "jogs," that streets not be built parallel with contour
lines, that streets not be built directly up steep slopes if
avoidable, etc. These problems are usually resolved satisfac-
torily in conference, and have not been widely litigated.
Where width and design requirements have been contested,
they have been upheld.
20
Another commonly-used condition to plat approval is the
improvement of streets. Most regulations require the devel-
oper, at his expense, to grade and pave the streets according
to stated specifications, and to install gutters, curbs, culverts,
drainage structures, and other necessary devices. The leading
case of Brous V. Smith21 upheld a regulation which required
suitably paved streets as a precondition to home construction,
and the other cases on point have followed this view.22 The
requirement that the developer absorb the costs of street
installation and improvement does not constitute a "taking"
in the constitutional sense; it is a reasonable condition to the
privilege of subdivision, the purposes of which are to insure
adequate access for the residents of the new subdivision and
to protect the municipality from the exceptional expense of
maintaining substandard avenues open and safe for travel.
The common practice is for the developer to dedicate to
the public the streets in his subdivision. Such an action gives
the public the land without cost and relieves the developer of
tax and maintenance costs and liabilities relating to the land.
20. Garvin v. Baker, 59 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1952); Petterson v. Naperville, 9
Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956) ; Baltimore v. Princeton Constr. Co., 229 Md.
176, 182 A.2d 803 (1962) ; Church of Sts. Peter & Paul v. Lake George, 252
Minn. 209, 89 N.W.2d 708 (1958) ; Noble v. Township Comm., 91 N.J. Super.
111, 219 A.2d 335 (Super. Ct. 1966).
21. 304 N.Y. 164, 105 N.E.2d 503 (1952).
22. ANDERSON §19.34.
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Rarely does a subdivision contain private thoroughfares. The
question whether a developer can be compelled to dedicate his
streets (without compensation) is rarely litigated since most
developers are eager to relinquish all responsibilities for these
areas once they have been cut and improved. The courts of
most states that have considered the matter have held that a
subdivider can be required to dedicate land for street purposes
provided the need for new (or wider) streets is specifically
and uniquely attributable to activity which arises from the
subdivision. On the other hand, if there is no anticipated
change in activity which will be attributable to the proposed
subdivision, a requirement that land be dedicated for new
public roadways is invalid.23
C. Water
The installation of water facilities is clearly essential to
the health and safety of the community. Most communities
require the installation of water systems and demand that
such facilities be constructed according to adopted specifica-
tions.24 Because the capital outlay for such systems can be
large, there has been some litigation on the reasonableness of
particular requirements, but the right to compel installation
of water supplies is rarely questioned.
Generally, the regulations require the subdivider to install
water mains throughout the tract, and the lines are connected
to the public water system. If the enabling legislation permits
it (as does section 14-350.325 in South Carolina), the few
23. Ayers v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Hudson Oil
Co. v. Wichita, 193 Kan. 623, 396 P.2d 271 (1964). (For a more detailed
consideration of the dedication process, see Part IV. infra). In a survey of
South Carolina communities and ten selected out-of-state cities and counties in
the southeast, conducted by the author in July-August, 1970, all agencies re-
ported that their regulations required installation of streets as a prerequisite to
plat approval. Most communities require the streets to be paved and otherwise
improved according to specified standards, but a small number of localities (all
in South Carolina) stated that in some cases paving is not necessary. In
Greenville, Aiken and Spartanburg, the city bears part of the cost of street
improvement, but in other reporting localities in the state the developer absorbs
all the expenses. (Of the out-of-state agencies, Charlotte and Atlanta report
cost-participation or reimbursement plans.) (For the questionnaire used in the
survey see W. LEDBErER, JR., SUBDIVSION CONTROL IN SOUTH CAROLINA app.
(1970) ).
24. Zastrow v. Brown, 9 Wis. 2d 100, 100 N.W.2d 359 (1960).
25. S.C. CODE AxN. §14-350.30 (Supp. 1970).
[Vol. 24
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cases on the point allow local regulations to require the
developer to absorb all costs of the waterlines.2 6 In Crownhifl
Homes, the Texas court made the following statements:
The authorities hold that the municipality has the right to impose
conditions on subdivision development, including the "donation" of
streets, alleys, drains, water mains, sewer mains and the like.... The
overwhelming weight of authority is that such donation is not a taking
of... property for public use without reimbursement The exercise of
governmental discretion to impose reasonable regulations as a condition
for the use of property, or as a condition precedent to the subdivision of
land, does not amount to a taking of private property for public use
without just compensation.
27
Of course, if a public water system is not accessible to
the proposed subdivision, it would be unreasonable to dis-
approve a plat for failure to provide public water. In such
cases-which are common in this State outside the urban
areas--regulations require water systems to be installed that
are connected to accessible service district lines, or require
the devloper to make provision for multi-lot wells or individual
pumps. These facilities must conform to the standards of the
State Health Department rules for water supplies. The De-
partment has promulgated regulations governing the develop-
ment of subdivisions pursuant to section 32-8,28 and enforces
them through the county health departments. Thus, as a
practical matter, planning agencies either do not regulate
the water supplies, or they approve them pro forma if they
satisfy the health authorities.
D. Sewers
Adequate sewage disposal is certainly a proper concern
of local government under the police power delegated to it by
subdivision control legislation. Thus, the installation of sewers
can be required as a condition to the approval of a plat.29
Such installations can be required to be in accordance with
26. E.g., Crownhill Homes, Inc. v. San Antonio, 433 S.W2d 448 (Tex. Ct
Civ. App. 1968).
27. Id. at 460. According to the survey conducted in July-August, 1970
(see note 23 supra), most communities require the developer to bear the ex-
penses of installation of waterlines, but a few communities, e.g., Aiken, Raleigh
(in some cases) and Atlanta, participate in the costs of such installations.
28. S.C. CoDE Axx. §32-8 (Supp. 1970).
29. Allen v. Stockwell, 210 Mich. 488, 178 N.W. 27 (1920).
9
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specifications and subject to periodic inspection by public
officials.A
0
As in the case of water systems, sewer lines are generally
installed throughout the tract and connected to the public
sewer main at some point. Almost everywhere where public
sewerage is available, private facilities and septic tanks are
discouraged or prohibited.
In South Carolina, those communities which provide
sewerage service require developers to hook on if the lines
are within reach of the tract (e.g., within 500 feet of the
property). In those numerous communities where no public
sewers are provided, the regulations either do not regulate the
sewage disposal or approve the facilities pro forma if they
satisfy health authorities. The Rules and Regulations Govern-
ing the Development of Subdivisions, 31 promulgated by the
State Department of Health, regulate private waste disposal
systems. These rules are now implemented and enforced
generally through the Pollution Control Authority, and gen-
erally require some sort of suitable neighborhood treatment
equipment, oxidation pond or lagoon, and permit septic tanks
only in infrequent instances of sizeable lots, proper soil
conditions, and no access to municipal lines or service district
lines.
In some of those areas that are not accessible to sewage
lines, there has been a proliferation of private sewage facilities
constructed by the developer and transferred to an uncapital-
ized utility corporation which has neither the personnel nor
inclination to maintain the facilities properly. Where these
facilities cause difficulty, litigation should be instituted
against the corporation and the developer who established it
(by "piercing the corporate veil" of the utility corporation).
Such proceeding can be instituted, arguably, by the aggrieved
purchasers in the subdivision, by the Pollution Control Au-
thority, the Public Service Commission, or perhaps by the
planning agency which approved the subdivision.
3 2
30. Mefford v. Tulare, 102 Cal. App. 2d 919, 228 P.2d 847 (Dist. Ct. App.
1951).
31. State Board of Health Rules and Regulations, S.C. CODE ANN., vol.
17 at 189-92 (Supp. 1970).
32. The survey conducted in July-August, 1970 (see note 23 .rupra), in-
dicates that all regulations in this state require developers to install proper
sewage facilities, and to connect to public mains if they are available. Where
public lines are inaccessible, the planning agencies defer to the Health Depart-
ment or Pollution Control regulations in one way or another.
[Vol. 24
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E. Drainage.
In order to create conditions favorable to the health and
safety of the residents, and to prevent inundation of proper-
ties,83 subdivision regulations normally require as a condition
to plat approval that storm drains be installed throughout
the tract. These facilities are usually provided at the devel-
oper's expense, according to specifications established by the
engineer of the municipality or county.8 4 One case has held
that the planning commission cannot arbitrarily reject drain-
age plans drawn by a competent engineer,35 but this decision
cannot be said to stand for the proposition that the subdivision
regulations cannot establish reasonable engineering standards
that must be adhered to by all developers.3 6
F. Miscellaneous Installations
In addition to the major improvements discussed in the
preceding sections, subdivision regulations often require the
developer to install street markers, curbs and gutters, fire-
alarm devices and sidewalks, usually at the expense of the
developer. In the few cases involving these items, the courts
have upheld enabling legislation and local regulations which
impose such installations as conditions to plat approval.3 7
G. Exactions of Land for Streets, Parks, School Sites, Etc.
1. In General
Of central importance in the system of subdivision control
is the dedication or reservation of land for streets, alleys,
drainage, water and sewage systems, and sometimes parks,
schools, and open spaces. If developers had discretion as to
width, design, and arrangement of streets and utilities, and
as to whether any provision would be made for open space,
drainage, etc., the communities would be plagued with night-
mare patterns and problems. Even assuming that many
developers would furnish their subdivisions with high quality
33. S.C. CoDE ANN. §14-350.30 (Supp. 1970).
34. Brown v. Joilet, 108 Ill. App. 2d 230, 247 NYE2d 47 (1969) ; Auto
Acceptance, Inc. v. Allentown, 431 Pa. 121, 244 A.2d 722 (1968).
35. Kesselring v. Wakefield Realty Co., 306 Ky. 725, 209 S.W.2d 63
(1948).
36. The survey conducted in July-August, 1970 (see note 23 supra), in-
dicates that all but two or three ordinances in South Carolina require adequate
drainage facilities. Several communities surveyed (Richmond, Raleigh, Atlanta,
Aiken and Spartanburg) assist in the cost of installation of drains.
37. See YoKaY §58.
11
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installations as inducements for purchase and as proud monu-
ments to their developmental savvy, their notions of quality
and arrangement may not comport with the plans established
by the community planning agency which is charged with the
responsibility of devising and implementing an overall plan
suitable to all interests of the area. For these reasons, almost
all subdivision regulations require these improvements as
conditions of approval of plats, and compel their dedication
to the public in most instances.
Dedication is a conveyance of an interest in land, a fee
or an easement, to the government for a public purpose. The
dedicator receives no compensation (the transfer is gratui-
tous) but usually this is done to achieve an end, such as plat
approval. Dedication can be accomplished by statutory proce-
dure in some states or pursuant to common law as in this and
many other states.3
Reservation of land, sometimes required instead of dedi-
cation, is the setting aside of specified land for a public
purpose. There is no conveyance but this procedure restricts
the developer's right to use the reserved land. In this fashion,
the local government gains protection of space needed for
parks, schools, street extension, and the like, but the developer
must be compensated for the land when the government
decides to acquire it. In most subdivision regulations, the
government must make a decision whether to utilize the land
within a specified period of time (e.g., 90 days, six months,
three years), or the developer can use the land as he had
intended.
Whether planning agencies can exact dedication or reser-
vation of land for various purposes and, if so, the limitations
of such power of exaction, are questions that are popular
topics of debate among planners and real estate lawyers today.
Most developers are willing and eager to dedicate their streets
and water and sewer mains to the public, so that they will be
relieved of the axes, maintenance costs, and landowner
liability on that land; thus, the main battles are being waged
over such things as parks, open spaces, and school sites.
These latter items involve expensive "gifts" if the local
authority can compel dedication of such areas as prerequisites
to plat approval.
38. For a discussion of dedication, see Part IV infra.
[Vol. 24
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Two rationales, similar but slightly different in approach,
have received the most attention as attempts to provide a
reasonable set of standards for the imposition of, and limita-
tions of, subdivision land exactions.
The theory used most often in judicial decisions is one
made popular by Ayres v. City Counci8 9 and Pioneer Trust
and Savings Bank v. Mount Prospeet,40 among others. The
question, said the Illinois Court in Pioneer Trust, is not one of
desirability of parks, education or other public conditions, but
rather, "one of determining who shall pay for such improve-
ments. Is it reasonable that a subdivider should be required
under the guise of a police power regulation to dedicate a
portion of his property to public use; or does this amount to a
veiled exercise of the power of eminent domain and a confisca-
tion of private property behind the defense of police regula-
tions?" 41 The Court then sought to answer the question by
resort to this test:
If the requirement is within the statutory grant of power to the
municipality and if the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically
and uniquely attributable to his activity, then the requirement is per-
missible; if not, it is forbidden and amounts to a confiscation of private
property in contravention of the constitutional prohibitions rather than
reasonable regulation under the police power.
42
This standard, which holds that the developer can be
required to assume those costs which are "specifically and
uniquely attributable" to his activity, and which would other-
wise cast the expense upon the public, is the most widely
used criterion. It lacks specificity and certainty, but it serves
as a guide to planning agencies and courts in their thinking
about exactions.
An attempt at a more sophisticated analysis using a dual
test for determining the legitimacy of exactions has been
urged by two authorities:
[I]nsofar as dedications, activities, and expenditures are positively re-
quired of the subdivider, these requirements should be reasonably
related to the subdivision in question and should concern types of im-
provement for which municipalities have generally been conceded the
power to levy special taxes or assessments.
The proposed test imposes two limitations upon the police power.
The first, reasonable relation to the subdivision, is quantitive and
39. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
40. 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E2d 799 (1961).
41. Id. at 381, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
42. Id.
13
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spatial. The benefits to be conferred by the required improvements
must inure directly to homeowners in the subdivision itself, and to the
extent that they inure to outsiders, compensation is required. The
second, that the improvement be one for which the municipality could
generally levy special assessments, is qualitative, based upon the type
of improvement concerned. These limitations intend to allow the taking
of private property without compensation only insofar as it is justified
by the underlying policy of subdivision legislation ...
The second limitation suggested above may be somewhat less clear;
it purports to limit the power of the municipality insofar as the im-
provements required are of a type which cannot generally be financed
by special assessment. Concerning this limitation, it should be noted
that a subdivision is potentially a drain on many aspects of the munici-
pal budget. It entails not only the extension of streets, sewers, and
recreational areas, but also the extension of public school facilities, of
police and fire protection, of various departments of sanitation. Argu-
ably, therefore, the subdivider could, in proper circumstances, be com-
pelled to construct a school building, or dedicate land for a fire station
and, in all circumstances, to pay fees for his pro rata portion of any
such extension. But the writers return to the special assessment analogy
to point out that while installation of streets, sewers, and parks, have
long been considered local in nature and financed by special assessment,
public school buildings and fire stations have generally been thought
to be so much a responsibility of the general public that such financing
was not available. While special circumstances may make it inappro-
priate, this distinction seems a proper basis for limiting the munici-
pality's constitutional power in the subdivision area, and it is thought
to be borne out by decisional law.43
The concept of special assessments upon which the Reps-
Smith theory 44 is based is in turn based on the doctrine:
[T]hat the property against which it is levied derives some special
benefit from the improvement; that while property is made to bear
the cost of the improvement, it or its owner suffers no pecuniary loss
thereby since the property is increased in value by an amount at least
equal to the sum it is required to pay. . . . [A] special assessment
can be levied only on land, is based -wholly on benefits conferred and
is exceptional both as to time and locality.4 5
Another approach, quite similar, is that expressed by
Allison Dunham, a noted legal scholar. He makes the distinc-
tion between (1) preventing developers from using their
property so as to cause harm to the community by burdening
the community with their own external costs, and (2) charg-
43. Reps and Smith, Control of Urban Land Division, 14 SYRA. L. REv.
405, 407-10 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
44. Id.
45. State Highway Comm'n v. Topeka, 193 Kan. 335, 337-38, 393 P.2d 1008,
1010 (1964) ; LEcooL, LAND DEVELOPMENT LAw 320 (1966).
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ing to developers the community costs of regulations designed
only to produce community benefits. The first notion is con-
sistent with our traditions and any exactions within this
category are valid; the latter is contrary to the just compensa-
tion provisions of the constitutions and exactions resting on
such a basis are not sustainable.46
Many of the decisions discussed in the following sections
do not fit any of the rationales described above, and some
cases do not articulate any meaningful standard or justifica-
tion for approving or disapproving a particular exaction.
Nevertheless, these tests are being considered more in the
recent cases and should be used by agencies and courts in this
state in making decisions with respect to the legality of
various land exactions.
2. Streets
Once the developer is saddled (in his view) with manda-
tory standards relating to width, paving, design and arrange-
ment of streets, and most utility lines, he has no brief for
retaining title to and responsibility for these areas. The sub-
divider usually parts with his interest in these areas without
protest because dedication means that he is no longer liable
for taxes on that land, he is not burdened with the cost of
maintenance of the facilities, and he is no longer susceptable
to landowner liabilities relating to the land.
Thus, the common practice is for subdividers to dedicate
the land to be used for street purposes in the tract. So long as
the enabling legislation permits compulsory dedication, the
courts uphold denial of plat approval for failure to dedicate
streets.47 Similarly, the courts have upheld the requirement
that the developer dedicate land to allow for street-widening
46. See Heynman and Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased
Community Costs on New Subdivision Residents Through Subdivision Exac-
tions, 73 YALE L. J. 1119 (1964) for a list and discussion of all of the tests that
have been proposed. See also Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control
Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 871 (1967).
47. Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P2d 1 (1949); Garvin v.
Baker, 59 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1952); Hudson Oil Co. v. Wichita, 193 Kan. 623,
396 P2d 271 (1964) ; Ridgefield Land Co. v. Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W.
58 (1928).
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to accommodate the increase of traffic caused by his subdivi-
sion.
48
In South Carolina, section 14-350.3049 authorizes required
dedication:
Such regulations may provide for... the dedication or reservation
of land for streets ... and other public services and facilities ....
3. Parks and Recreational Areas
Open space in the central cities disappeared before plan-
ners and land development experts realized what had hap-
pened. To avert this tragedy in the rapidly-developing
suburbs, many municipalities in some parts of the country
are requiring as a condition for plat approval the dedication
or reservation of certain land for public use as a park or play-
ground.
This requirement has given rise to more protests and,
consequently, to more litigation, than forced dedication of
streets and utility lines. Streets and sewage and water facil-
ities are essential parts of every neighborhood and developers
have little hesitancy about providing for them in some fashion.
But parks and playgrounds are less common and, the developer
usually reasons, should be added or omitted as his business
judgment dictates. Besides, this argument would go, parks
and playgrounds benefit the total community and should
be purchased with general tax money, not exacted from
private developers.
The courts that have considered the matter have found
no basis for the position that such a public acquisition is a
taking without just compensation and have resolved the
matter in favor of legality.50 The Montana Court, in Billings
Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County,5 reasoned that "if the
subdivision creates the specific need for such parks and play-
grounds, then it, is not unreasonable to charge the subdivider
with the burden of providing them.
' 52
48. Newton v. American Sec. Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941);
Southern Pacific Co. v. Los Angeles, 242 Cal. App. 2d 38, 51 Cal. Rptr. 197
(Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Krieger v. Howard County, 224 Md. 320, 167 A2<1 885
(Ct. App. 1961).
49. S.C. CODE ANx. §14-350.30 (Supp. 1970).
50. Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 27 Conn. Supp.
74, 230 A.2d 45 (Super. Ct. 1967); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone
County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964); Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28
Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W2d 442 (1965).
51. 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964).
52. Id. at 33, 394 P.2d at 187.
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In this state, section 14-350.3053 provides for dedication
of land for "recreational areas ... and other public services
and facilities," which surely includes parks and playgrounds.
Whether this statutory provision is valid as constitutionally
within the scope of police power, or is a taking without just
compensation, has not been decided in this State and there
are no analogies from which a prediction can be drawn.
54
Subdivision regulations that provide for exactions in other
jurisdictions require amounts ranging from three to twelve
percent of the platted land.5 5
In some communities which use exactions to acquire space
for parks, a further step has been taken: money in lieu of
land. Because all land is not suitable for parks and recreation,
the community requires the developer to pay an equivalent
amount of money into a fund marked for park and recreational
use. The amount is usually set at so much per lot, and some
regulations figure the fee as a percentage of the assessed value
of the land on the plat.
The courts are divided on the issue of exactions of money
in lieu of land. Most of the decisions that disapprove the
tactic argue simply that the agency's authority to require
dedication O does not impliedly grant authority to require
money payments.57 The rationale for disapproval, other than
merely lack of statutory authority, seems to be that the fund
into which the money is to be paid is not specifically confined
and limited to the benefit of the particular subdivision-it is
used for parks all over the community, which are not "specifi-
53. S.C. CODE ANN. §14-350.30 (Supp. 1970).
54. The survey conducted in July-August, 1970, (see note 23 supra) did
not locate any South Carolina county or municipality that requires dedication
of land for parks as a condition to plat approval. Some communities encourage
this practice in rapidly-growing suburbs and some communities use the reserva-
tion method whereby the developer is required to hold certain portions of his
land for a specified period of time (e.g., 90 days, one year, etc.) to give the
government or some agency thereof (e.g., the school board or the parks com-
mission) time to make a decision whether it should purchase the site for public
use.
55. ADERsoN §19.39.
56. See, e.g., S.C. CoDE ANN. §14-350.30 (Supp. 1970).
57. Kelber v. Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (Dist. Ct. App.
1957) ; Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comnm'n, 27 Conn. Supp.
74, 230 A.2d 45 (Super. Ct. 1967) ; Coronado Dev. Co. v. McPherson, 189 Kan.
174, 368 P.2d 51 (1962); Gordon v. Wayne, 370 Mich. 329, 121 N.W.2d 823
(1963).
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cally and uniquely attributable" to the subdivision in ques-
tion.
A few courts have approved the money exaction, relying
essentially on the reasoning of Jordan v. Menomonee Falls :5
The basis of upholding a compulsory land dedication requirement
in a platting ordinance.., is this: The municipality by approval of a
proposed subdivision plat enables the subdivider to profit financially by
selling the subdivision lots as home building sites and thus realizing a
greater price than could have been obtained if he had sold his property
as unplatted lands. In return for this benefit the municipality may
require him to dedicate part of his platted land to meet a demand to
which the municipality would not have been put but for the influx of
people into the community to occupy the subdivision lots. 59
The Jordan court also reasoned that:
[I]n most instances it would be impossible for the municipality to
prove that the land required to be dedicated for a park or a school
site was to meet a need solely attributable to the anticipated influx of
people into the community to occupy this particular subdivision. On
the other hand, the municipality might well be able to establish that a
group of subdivisions approved over a period of several years had
been responsible for bringing into the community a considerable num-
ber of people making it necessary that the land dedications required of
the subdividers be utilized for school, park and recreational purposes
for the benefit of such influx. In the absence of contravening evidence
this would establish a reasonable basis for finding that the need for the
acquisition was occasioned by the activity of the subdivider.60
Thus, in justifying exactions of land for park purposes,
the Wisconsin Court expressly repudiated the "specifically
and uniquely attributable" test 61 as too stringent. In Jenad,
Inc. v. Scarsdale,62 the New York court overruled prior cases
and upheld a land exaction declaring "[t] his is not a tax but a
reasonable form of village planning for the general community
good."
6
3
4. School Sites
The dramatic increase in subdivision development has
created the need for many new and expanded school facilities
in the growing areas. To make provision for these educational
58. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
59. Id. at 619-20, 137 N.W.2d at 448.
60. Id. at 617-18, 137 N.W.2d at 447.
61. See notes 42 and 43 supra and accompanying text.
62. 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
63. Id. at 84, 218 N.E.2d at 676, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 958. See also Colorado
Springs v. Kitty Hawk Dev. Co., 154 Colo. 535, 392 P.2d 467 (1964).
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demands, some communities in other jurisdictions have at-
tempted to pass much of the cost on to the developer (and,
consequently, to the incoming residents) by requiring as a
condition for plat approval that the developer dedicate certain
land in the tract for school sites.
Unlike parks, recreational areas and open spaces, schools
are seldom "specifically and uniquely attributable" to a parti-
cular subdivision. Further, schools, like most other public
services unrelated to land, traditionally have been supported
by general tax funds. For these reasons, land exactions for
school purposes do not meet either of the two prevailing
tests. 64 Thus, in the most frequently cited case, the Illinois
Court held that a subdivider could not be compelled to dedicate
a school site even though his development would undoubtedly
"aggravate" the existing school situation. 65
The exception to the above-stated rule is Jordon v. Meno-
monee Falls,66 where the Court approved the requirement that
a subdivider dedicate land for schools. There, the Court
discarded the older "specifically and uniquely attributable"
test and said that it is proper for a community to require a
developer to provide land for expanded public facilities needed
because of his and other subdivisions in the area.67
In a few jurisdictions where exactions are being used,
some communities have tried to exact money in lieu of land
from subdividers as a condition of plat approval. To justify
this additional step in the exaction approach, it is said that
this is preferable to the dedication of a small parcel in each
subdivision because those sites would be inadequate in size
and imperfectly located. Most of the cases conclude that the
governing authorities and the planning agencies have no
power to implement this technique.68 A lower Illinois court
64. See notes 42 and 43 sspra and accompanying text.
65. Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22 IIl. 2d 375, 176
N.E.2d 799 (1961).
66. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
67. The survey conducted in July-August, 1970 (see note 23 supra) did not
locate any South Carolina county or municipality which requires dedication of
land for school purposes as a condition to plat approval. Some communities
use the reservation method whereby the developer is required to hold certain
portions of his land for a specified period of time to give the school board or
some other agency time to make a decisoin whether it should purchase the site.
68. Kelber v. Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (Dist. Ct. App.
1957) ; Rosen v. Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960); West
Park Ave., Inc. v. Ocean, 48 N.J. 122, 224 A2d 1 (1966).
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approved an agreement between a subdivider and the board
of education whereby the former would pay the latter $95,000
toward the erection of a school building, although the de-
veloper later claimed that this arrangement was entered under
duress.00 In the sweeping decision of the Wisconsin Court in
Jordan v. Menomonee Falls,70 the exaction of money in lieu
of land for educational purposes was approved.
IV. DEDICATION
A. In General
Dedication is the term applied to the several ways by
which the owner of land gratuitously transfers to the public
an interest in the land or some privilege of use thereof.
71
Dedication may be formal or informal, may concern either a
fee or some lesser interest such as an easement, and may be
by statute (in the jurisdictions where such procedure exists)
or pursuant to common law.
Land may be dedicated to the public for any number of
purposes. Although most dedications involve streets and
thoroughfares, land may be dedicated for recreational areas,
parks, open spaces, school sites, cemeteries, and the like.72
The common practice is for the developer of a subdivision
to dedicate to the public the streets in his subdivision, along
with various facilities such as water and sewer mains. Such
an action gives the public the land without costs and liabilities
relating to ownership of the land. But as noted previously,
unless the subdivision regulations require it as a condition to
plat approval, developers seldom dedicate open space, parks
and school sites. The reasons for this are obvious: the amount
of land involved is greater and is more apparently a salable
portion of the tract, and these latter items are not generally
thought of by developers as "essential services" in a sub-
division.
B. Common Law Dedication
1. In General
The concept of dedication has been long entrenched in
the common law and is still widely used today. Many states
69. Board of Educ. v. E. A. Herzog Constr. Co., 29 Ill. App. 2d 138, 172
N.E.2d 645 (1961).
70. 28 Wis. 2d 608; 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
71. Grady v. Greenville, 129 S.C. 89, 123 S.E2d 494 (1924).
72. Compulsory dedications, or exactions, are discussed later in this article.
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have statutes setting forth procedure for dedication but there
are numerous jurisdictions, including South Carolina, which
have no statutory process and which depend on the common
law methods. (Even in those states which provide for statu-
tory dedication, it is usually said that the statute is not exclu-
sive and that common law dedication can be found in lieu of
the statutory scheme, or where an attempt to comply with the
statute falls short but meets the requirements of the common
law) .78
The operative facts requisite to finding a dedication have
two aspects: the objectively manifested desire of the developer
to devote his land, or an interest in it, to public use; and the
public acceptance of this offer.74 These requirements are
analogous to the offer and acceptance of the law of contracts.
Policy considerations strengthen this analogy. Because dedica-
tion involves a transfer of an interest in land, a showing of
unequivocal manifestation of a desire of the dedicator to part
with his land is demanded. On the other hand, the public
must be protected from landowners who want to get rid of
land which would be more of a burden to taxpayers than a
benefit to the public.
2. Offer
The main essential of a dedication is the offer - a mani-
fested desire of the dedicator to part with his land.7 5 Although
some states require only a preponderance of the evidence to
establish an intent to dedicate, South Carolina requires that
the intent to dedicate be shown by clear, cogent and convincing
evidence. 76 The intent to dedicate, or offer, can be shown by
the developer platting his land and selling lots pursuant to a
plat, by execution and delivery of a deed or other instrument
which contains recitals recognizing the public's rights in the
land, by the developer's oral declarations, by affirmative acts
of the developer, or by the developer's acquiescence in the pub-
lice use of the disputed land for a public purpose.
Probably the most frequent form of common law dedica-
tion is that which involves the filing of a plat. Whether or
73. 26 C.J.S. Dedication §§3-4 (1956).
74. 6 Pownu, REAL PROPERTY §934 (1968) [hereinafter cited as POWELL].
75. Note, What Constitutes Intent to Dedicate, 6 S.C.L.Q. 96 (1953).
76. Antonakas v. Chamber of Commerce, 130 S.C. 215, 126 S.E.35 (1925);
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Fairfax, 80 S.C. 414, 61 SXE. 950 (1908). See
AxDERsoN §1927.
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not subdivision regulations require it, most subdivisions are
developed and marketed by reference to a plat recorded in the
courthouse. These survey maps show the streets and other
public areas and often make some express reference to the
fact that the designated areas are public lands. As a general
rule, if an owner of a tract of land plats it and sells lots by
reference to the plat, this constitutes a sufficient offer to
dedicate the areas designated for public use. Some jurisdic-
tions hold that such a transaction constitutes a completed
transaction, because of a presumed acceptance, and in fact one
South Carolina case takes this position7 7 The better view,
however, is that the making of a plat and the sale of lots in
reference thereto are merely evidence of an intent to dedicate,
which intent, or offer, must be acted upon, or accepted, like
any other common law dedication.78 This is the rule in South
Carolina. At least in those communities which adopt sub-
division regulations pursuant to the Comprehensive Planning
Act, the following statute applies:
The approval of a plat by the local planning commission shall not
be deemed to constitute or effect an acceptance by the municipality or
the county or the public of the dedication of any street or other ground
shown upon the plat.
79
To be distinguished from dedication, but perhaps just as
important, is the rule that sales of lots in a subdivision by
reference to a plat creates private easements to the streets,
etc., in the purchasers who buy lots in reliance on the plat
references. Although the courts often talk of these private
rights as "dedication," there is clearly a distinction. The
South Carolina Supreme Court has said:
As between the owner, who has conveyed lots according to a plat,
and his grantee or grantees, the dedication is complete when the con-
veyance is made, even though the street is not accepted by the public
authorities. 80
The court went on to say:
Persons owning lots fronting on or adjacent to property dedicated
as public parks or squares, or streets, highways, and the like, have such
special property interests as entitle them to maintain a suit for the
77. Marshall v. Columbia & Eau Claire Elec. S. Ry., 73 S.C. 241, 53 S.E.
417 (1905).
78. Outlaw v. Moise, 222 S.C. 24, 71 S.E.2d 509 (1952); Cason v. Gibson,
217 S.C. 500, 61 S.E.2d 58 (1950).
79. S.C. CODE ANN. §14-350.34 (Supp. 1970).
80. Cason v. Gibson, 217 S.C. 500, 509, 61 S.E.2d 58, 62 (1950), citing,
16 Amr. JuR. Dedication §31 (1938).
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enforcement and preservation of the use of the property as such. This
right is not affected by the fact that the dedication has never been
accepted by the municipal authorities.8 1
Despite some restrictive wording in the Cason case, the
South Carolina Court apparently subscribes to the so-called
"broad view" that a purchaser who buys in reference to a plat
gets an easement in all streets and other such areas, near or
remote, as laid out on the plat by which he purchases.8 2 This
is in contrast to the narrower view that the purchaser has an
interest only in those streets and similar areas which abut
or adjoin his property.
While the principle of private easements is not a part of
the law of dedication, it acts as a vital complement to dedica-
tion. In those cases where the public does not accept the
developer's offer of dedication, and in those cases where the
public accepts the offer and later abandons or vacates the
dedicated land, the rules discussed in the preceding two para-
graphs afford protection to those persons who have purchased
lots in the tract in reliance on a plat which designated various
areas as available for public use.
In some cases, intention to dedicate can be found in decla-
rations and conduct of the developer which fall short of plat-
ting or execution of a legal instrument. For example, an
"implied offer" of dedication has been found where the land-
owner petitioned the governing authority to grade the streets,
or where the landowner asked the city street department to
pave the streets, or where the landowner continually referred
to the land as "public" in character. 83 Considerable ambiguity
exists in this type of manifestation of intent, and it is for
this reason that the cases commonly say that the evidence
must be clear, cogent and convincing.
An intention to dedicate can be found by inference from
long acquiescence to use of the land for a public purpose. In
Shia v. Pendergrass84 the court recognized this principle but
refused to apply it to that case because the landowner had
allowed only certain tenants and patrons of those tenants to
81. 217 S.C. at 510, 61 S.E.2d at 62, citing, 26 CJ.S. Dedicatio, §71 (1956).
82. Blue Ridge Realty Co. v. Williamson, 247 S.C. 112, 145 S.E.2d 922
(1965); Newton v. Batson, 223 S.C. 545, 77 S.E.2d 212 (1953); Outlaw v.
Moise, 222 S.C. 24, 71 S.E.2d 509 (1952) ; Billings v. McDaniel, 217 S.C. 261,
60 S.E.2d 592 (1950).
83. PowEm §935.
84. 222 S.C. 342, 72 S.E.2d 699 (1952).
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travel the alleyway in question. The use must be by the public
at large, and not by a limited number of persons.
In most cases today, the developer's intent to dedicate
is clearly manifested by his execution of a deed to the munici-
pality or county. In Glenn v. Woodworth8 5 the deed to the
City of Spartanburg of land partly in and partly out of the
city provided that the city should improve roads on that part
of the tract inside the city "and I am to improve roads and
streets lying outside of the city limits on the said tract of
land. 80 The court held that this language manifested an
intent to dedicate those streets. The better practice is to
transfer the land by general warranty deed conveying a fee
simple title.
Of course, a subdivider will not be held to have dedicated
land if the intention to dedicate is absent or is negatived by
his conduct. For example, an intention not to dedicate can
be inferred from the payment of taxes on the land.87 However,
such payment is not conclusive evidence of an intention not to
dedicate.88 Thus, various acts of the developer which seem to
suggest an offer of dedication can be rebutted by certain acts
(e.g., payment of taxes, obstruction of the area) and state-
ments (e.g., declarations that the land belongs to him) incon-
sistent with the alleged offer. Further, a plat can contain a
notation preventing the inference that selling lots by reference
to a recorded plat constitutes an offer of dedication of the
streets and similar designated areas. In Tyler v. Guerry89 the
court held that the fact that landowners supplied labor and
material to construct a road over their land was inconsistent
with dedication of the road to the public.
An offer to dedicate can be made only by one competent
to so act. Since the law of dedication involves a transfer of an
interest in real estate, the rules applicable to competency in
deeds and grants are relevant.90 No one other than the owner
of the fee simple title or someone expressly authorized by him
can make a dedication of land.9 1
85. 197 S.C. 56, 14 S.E2d 555 (1941).
86. Id. at 59, 14 S.E.2d at 557.
87. Shia v. Pendergrass, 222 S.C. 342, 72 S.E2d 699 (1952). See ANDEa-
sox §19.28.
88. Woodside Mills v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 356 (D.S.C. 1958).
89. 251 S.C. 120, 160 S.E2d 889 (1968).
90. Grady v. Greenville, 129 S.C. 89, 123 S.E. 494 (1924).
91. Safety Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Lyles, 131 S.C. 540, 128 S.E. 724 (1925).
See 26 C.J.S. Dedication §7 (1956).
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3. Acceptance
Where a valid offer has been made by the developer, the
purported dedication is incomplete absent acceptance by acts
of public officials or by general public use.92 The acceptance
may be by formal act or by conduct of government officials or
the general public. Treatises say that an acceptance must be
made within a reasonable time after the offer by the devel-
oper, but a South Carolina case holds that an acceptance can
occur twenty years after the offer of a right-of-way dedica-
tion was made.93
A municipality or county can accept an offer of dedica-
tion by formal action, as by passing an ordinance or a resolu-
tion. Another clear formal act quite often used is the
acceptance of a deed from the developer conveying the various
areas in the subdivision to the public.
An "implied" acceptance may be inferred in a variety of
ways. Frequently, acceptance is proved by such governmental
conduct as grading, paving or maintaining the public area.
Other examples of conduct from which an acceptance can be
inferred include: installation of sidewalks along and sewers
under the streets; park improvements on the area offered for
park purposes; ordinances adopted to appropriate funds to
pave one of the streets designated on the plat; letting bids
for construction of culverts and other improvements along
the street.9 4 The general public's use of the land for the pur-
pose for which it was dedicated also can suffice to raise the
inference of acceptance. 95
Whether the governing authority can accept only a part
of the offered land is a question on which there is a split of
opinion. As one writer has said, "It seems reasonable that
there should be a power in the offeree to take for the public
such part, and such part only, as is believed useful to the
public, except where the terms of the offer clearly restrict
acceptance to all or none."96 In Corbin v. Cherokee Realty
Co. 9 7 the court upheld the right of the city to accept a part of
the street right-of-way and to reject the remainder.
92. Hodge v. Manning, 241 S.C. 142, 127 S.E2d 341 (1962).
93. Corbin v. Cherokee Realty Co., 299 S.C. 16, 91 S.E2d 542 (1956).
94. ANDEmSo §19.28; PoWEU. §935.
95. 26 CJ.S. Dedication §37 (1956).
96. PoWuL §935.
97. 229 S.C. 16, 91 S.E2d 542 (1956).
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Although some courts state that in some circumstances
an acceptance is presumed because of the benefit to the public,
most authorities agree that this presumption is not a proper
one. For instance, a few cases in other jurisdictions hold that
recording a plat with streets and other areas designated for
public use constitutes a dedication, not merely an offer, be-
cause acceptance is presumed. This view is not accepted by
the later South Carolina cases.98 Clearly an acceptance is not
presumed in plat cases at least in those communities which
adopt subdivision regulations pursuant to the Comprehensive
Planning Act, because of section 14-350.34,99 which states:
The approval of a plat by the local planning commission shall not
be deemed to constitute or effect an acceptance by the municipality
or county or the public of the dedication of any street or other ground
shown upon the plat.
4. Effect
Under common law dedications, the public typically gets
only an easement, with the fee left in the dedicator. 100 This is
not true where the document-the plat, deed or other legal
instrument-expressly states or strongly indicates that the
dedication is in fee and that the dedicator retains no interest
in the land so dedicated.
Sometimes, a dedicator may want to impose reservations
or restrictions on the land that he dedicates. The courts gen-
erally say that such restrictions are invalid if they interfere
with the necessary control by public authorities over the dedi-
cated area. In such cases, the dedication is effective but the
attempted restrictions are killed.10'
A similar problem arises when the statement of purpose
in the original dedication operates to prevent utilization of the
land from keeping pace with environmental changes. These
matters are handled with some flexibility, but definite state-
ments of purpose in the original dedication do fix an outer
limit on changes in use. The concept of cy pres, which is a
rule familiar to other areas of the law by which the intention
98. Outlaw v. Moise, 222 S.C. 24, 71 S.E.2d 509 (1952); Cason v. Gibson,
217 S.C. 500, 61 S.E.2d 58 (1950). See Note, What Constitutes Intent to
Dedicate, 6 S.C.L.Q. 96 (1953).
99. S.C. CoDE ANN. §14-350.34 (Supp. 1970).
100. Leppard v. Central Carolina Tel. Co., 205 S.C. 1, 30 S.E_2d 755
(1944). See POWELL §936.
101. POWELL §936.
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of the party is carried out as near as may be when it would
be impossible or illegal to give it literal effect, is liberally
invoked in some jurisdictions. In South Carolina, the court
has followed the rule that where the intention of the dedicator
is uncertain or the dedication is in general, unrestrictive
terms, the property can be used for any public purpose as
determined by the proper legal authority, and the fact that
the property has been devoted to one use does not deprive its
devotion to other more comprehensive uses. For example, in
Knoerr v. Crews,102 the court held that the city of Seneca
could use certain parcels for parking which were originally
dedicated "for the convenience of the public and of the said
Railway Company," although the land had been used for many
years as a park. On the other hand, where the intent is
expressed and is specific and restricted, no deviation from
such use may be permitted no matter how advantageous the
changed use may be to the public. 0 3 The court in a highly
questionable decision'04 held that the city could not permit a
private garage to extend out over the street for eight feet
because the street area had been dedicated to the public for
transportation purposes and could not be used for another pur-
pose.10 5 A use of the land by the public authorities for
purposes other than those contemplated in the dedication will
be restrained upon the application of owners of such land
injured by such change of use or by the dedicator if he has
given only an easement.10 6
5. Abandonment and Vacation
It is never easy to establish a public abandonment of
dedicated land. Misuse or diversion does not constitute aban-
donment. 07 Generally, abandonment may be shown by an
attempt to convey the land, a substitution of other land for
the purpose indicated in the dedication, a long period of
nonuse, or some other strong showing that the municipality
102. 246 S.C. 174, 143 S.E2d 120 (1965).
103. Miller v. Columbia, 138 S.C. 343, 136 S.E. 484 (1927). See also
Grady v. Greenville, 129 S.C. 89, 123 S.E. 494 (1924).
104. 235 S.C. 277, 111 S.E2d 573 (1959).
105. See Guerard and Sinkler, Public Corporations, Survey of South Caro-
lina Law: April 1959-April 1960, 13 S.C.L.Q. 370 (1961).
106. 4 H. TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §1113 (3d ed. 1939) [herein-
after cited as TIFFANY].
107. PowaN. §936.
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or county no longer assumes title to and responsibility for the
area.
Nonuse can establish failure to accept an offer of dedica-
tion, but can seldom be used to show an abandonment once
the dedication has been accepted. In Chaffee v. Aiken'0 8 the
plaintiff brought action against the city seeking to enjoin its
attempt to open a street on part of her property. The defen-
dant city claimed title to the disputed land by dedication and
the plaintiff raised the issue of abandonment because the city
had not used the strip. The court said, "[W]e do not think
that mere nonuse of a street or alley of a town, for a period
of twenty years, would amount to such an abandonment as
would destroy the rights of the public."'
10 9
In some states there is a statutory method of vacation.
In this state any interested party may move the court to
vacate a street, road or highway, and the court may make
appropriate findings. These statutory provisions do not
affect the other methods of termination of dedicated lands." 0
On abandonment or vacation, the question arises as to
who owns the dedicated land. As is generally the case in
common law dedications, only an easement is transferred to
the public with title in fee retained by the dedicator. This
being so, upon abandonment of the dedicated land, the dedi-
cator or those claiming under him would resume complete
dominion and ownership of the land.
However, if the dedicator has conveyed parcels along the
street or highway, he has probably conveyed to the purchasers
the fee to the roadbed. It is a well settled rule of construction
in boundary cases that when a grantor owns the land under
the street or highway, and sells land along that street or high-
way, there is a presumption that he intends to convey the
fee of the land to the center of the street or highway. So,
when lots abutting a street are conveyed by terms of descrip-
tion which makes no mention of the street, as when conveyed
by plat, the grantor's interest in the land within the street
limits presumably passes to the grantee. The same presump-
tion applies where the grantor sells land along the highway
and describes the land as bounded "by," "on!' or as running
"along" the street or highway. Of course, this presumption
108. 57 S.C. 507, 35 S.E. 800 (1900).
109. Id. at 516-17, 35 SX.. at 803.
110. S.C. CODE AxN. §§33-521 to -524 (Supp. 1970).
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can be rebutted by an express reservation of the streets to
the developer.11' Thus, in subdivisions, the abutting owners
normally acquire the interest in the abandoned street.112 This
has been held to be the rule even where the fee is vested in the
public.1 3 In Greenville v. Bozeman' 14 the South Carolina
court said that title vested in the abutting propery owners
unless the original owner had specifically reserved the right
of reversion on vacation. Where larger tracts are involved,
such as parks and recreational areas, a different rule probably
applies. For example, in Mosely v. Searcy,1" 5 title to a dedi-
cated park was held to revert to the dedicator upon abandon-
ment.
Several situations which may arise upon abandonment of
highway right-of-ways are not within the scope of this
material. Suffice it to state that owners of land along public
ways have no property or other vested right in continuance of
the road, and the public authorities may abandon the road." 6
On the other hand, the public authorities cannot close the
abandoned road withoui paying damages to the affected abut-
ting landowners."
17
C. Statutory Dedication
A procedure for dedicating land is prescribed by statute
in several states. This type of dedication cannot exist without
a statute, and therefore is not available in South Carolina.
There is special legislation applicable to Greenville County
requiring all land dedicated therein to be conveyed to the
county by deed.118
V. RELIEF FRM SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS
A. Variance
Some enabling acts authorize administrative relief from
subdivision regulations in cases of hardship, much like that
provided by variances in zoning laws."19 In South Carolina,
111. TIFFANY §996.
112. AxDmEsox §19.30; PowELL §936.
113. TIFFANY §1113.
114. 254 S.C. 306, 175 SXE.2d 211 (1970).
115. 363 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1962).
116. State v. Hughes, 147 S.C. 452, 145 S.E. 297 (1928).
117. Highway Dept. v. Allison, 246 S.C. 389, 143 S.E2d 800 (1965);
Powell v. Spartanburg County, 136 S.C. 371, 134 S.E. 367 (1926).
118. S.C. CODE ArN. §33-1679 (Supp. 1970).
,119. AxDERsoN §19.47.
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it seems that a variance from the subdivision regulations may
be obtained by appealing to the board of adjustment from an
adverse decision by the planning commission, 120 but there is
some question whether this is the intent of the legislation.
The variance may be granted in an individual case of unnec-
essary hardship upon a finding by the board of adjustment
that:
(a) There are extraordinary and exceptional conditions pertaining
to the particular piece of property in question because of its size, shape
or topography, and
(b) The application of the ordinance or resolution of this particular
piece of property would create an unnecessary hardship, and
(c) Such conditions are peculiar to the particular piece of property
involved, and
(d) Relief, if granted, would not cause substantial detriment to the
public good or impair the purposes and intent of the ordinance or
resolution or the comprehensive plan....1
Because of the paucity of judicial decisions, such terms
as "unnecessary hardship" and "substantial detriment" in
the context of subdivision regulations are not defined, but
certainly reference can be made to the decisions relating to
these issues in zoning variances since the statute applies to
both and many of the concepts are derived from similar policy
considerations.
122
B. Waiver of Conditions
Subdivision enabling acts provide that the planning
commission must impose certain standards on all subdivisions,
and may require certain other conditions on plat approval. 
23
For example, section 14-350.30124 provides that subdivision
regulations shall "prescribe that no subdivision plan will be
approved unless all land intended for use as building sites
can be used safely for building purposes, without danger from
flood or other inundation or from other menaces to health,
safety or public welfare." This standard, although very broad
in nature, is clearly mandatory and cannot be waived in any
case. On the other hand, it is generally accepted that the
120. S.C. CODE ANN. §14-350.19 (Supp. 1970).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., W. LEDBETTER, JR, ZONING LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA 12-18
(1970), for a discussion of variances in zoning administration.
123. The imposition of conditions on plat approval is discussed earlier in
this article at Part III mtpra.
124. S.C. CODE ANN. §14-350.30 (Supp. 1970).
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planning agency may waive some of the technical engineering
specifications in cases of substantial difficulty or hardship.
The many provisions relating to the grading and surfacing of
streets, water supply, sewers, utility lines, piping, connections,
and other facilities to be installed as conditions to plat ap-
proval, are quite often altered to resolve conflicts that arise
during consultation between the developer or his engineer
and ihe planning agency. Little litigation has arisen on the
subject because these matters are engineering questions and
are treated with reasonable flexibility even in exceptional
cases.
It has been held, however, that where a planning commis-
sion has authority to waive conditions, e.g., restrictions on
dead-end streets, it must support its decision by findings that
strict adherence to the regulations would cause impractical
hardship.
12 5
CONCLUSION
Efficient land use and effective land use control become
increasingly more important each year as rural land is urban-
ized. Few cities or communities are willing or financially able
to subsequently undertake correction of problems created by
planless growth, and state and local government regulations
of land subdivision is perhaps the only way to avoid costly
consequences of haphazard and unrestrained subdivision de-
velopment. The fact that the community as a whole is vitally
concerned with and affected by the process of subdivision
justifies governmental control over individual private land
developers.
The South Carolina Comprehensive Planning Act sub-
division regulations grant the basic authority needed by local
government units to control the physical development of their
communities. Prudent and reasonable regulations adopted by
local governing bodies pursuant to the authority granted can
promote the economic interests and general welfare of grow-
ing communities and private developers alike.
125. Smith v. Morris, 101 NJ. Super. 271, 244 A.2d 145 (Super. Ct. 1968).
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